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International Union, U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls:
The History of Litigation Alliances and Mobilization to
Challenge Fetal Protection Policies
Caroline Bettinger-López and Susan Sturm1
I.

Introduction

On August 9, 1982, Johnson Controls, the nation’s largest manufacturer of car
batteries, instituted a new “Fetal Protection Policy.”2 This policy banned all fertile
women working in the company’s United States Globe Battery Division, regardless of
age or personal circumstances, from working in jobs that involved exposure to lead.
Lead, an integral component of batteries, was abundant in battery manufacturing
facilities. Johnson Controls explained its policy shift as a response to scientific evidence
linking lead exposure before and during pregnancy with birth defects in children, and
noted that several workers had recently shown lead levels that exceeded the OSHA
standard for pregnant women. Johnson Controls’ policy followed the practice of other
companies in the chemical and heavy metal industry which, fearing mounting tort
liability for employees’ children born with lead-associated birth defects, had adopted
similar policies in the preceding decade.
Almost overnight, life changed dramatically for most of the Globe Battery
Division’s 275 female employees in 14 plants across the country. Johnson Controls’
Fetal Protection Policy left most female production and maintenance employees with an
agonizing choice: either get surgically sterilized and continue working in a
production/maintenance job that in the blue collar world paid top dollar and came with
excellent benefits, or accept a transfer to a lower-paying, lower-prestige job that had
reduced benefits and opportunities for promotion and overtime but lower lead exposure
levels. The new policy also meant that a female employee’s very presence on the shop
floor exposed an intimate detail about her life – her infertility – to her male co-workers.
Some women, such as 34-year old Gloyce Qualls, opted for sterilization. Qualls
was making $450 a week burning lead posts into large industrial batteries at Johnson
Controls’ Milwaukee, Wisconsin plant. In August 1982, when the company enacted its
fetal protection policy, she had just bought a new car, moved into a new apartment, and
was planning to marry a man with four children. Two weeks after company officials told
her that they would transfer her to a new $200-a-week position, pursuant to the new fetal
protection policy, she underwent tubal ligation.3 Many women workers like Qualls were
juggling tangible hazards in their lives – domestic violence, health problems, and poverty
– and needed the financial and professional cushion their factory jobs provided. They
had tried to reduce their exposure to lead by wearing protective gear, maintaining good
hygiene, and requesting temporary transfers to reduce body lead levels. Such measures,
however, were no longer an option under the new fetal protection policy.
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Others decided against sterilization. This was the case for Virginia Green and
other older female employees, many of whose doctors warned of serious risks associated
with such surgery for women over age 50. Although Green was aware of the dangers
lead posed to fetuses, she was not particularly concerned about this risk affecting her, as
she was 50 years old, divorced, and not planning on having any more children. After
eleven years on the shop floor, Green was transferred from the battery assembly line,
where she was making nine dollars an hour plus time and a half overtime, to a job as a
respirator sanitizer, “a glorified laundress,” where she made far less money and became
the butt of male co-workers’ fertility jokes.4
Across the country, Johnson Controls employees, mostly female, trickled into the
local bargaining units of their union, the United Auto Workers (UAW), to file grievances.
The grievances culminated in a class action lawsuit against Johnson Controls. The
individual complainants represented a cross-section of employees: Elsie Nason, a fifty
year old divorcee; Mary Craig, who elected to be sterilized in order to ensure her job; and
Donald Penney, who requested but was denied a three-month leave of absence in order to
lower his blood lead levels to enable him to safely father a child, and who was
subsequently “harassed and intimidated” by the plant’s personnel manager. Both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on summary judgment, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. On March 21, 1991, the Supreme Court held that
sex-specific fetal protection policies violate Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination
in employment contained in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court found
Johnson Controls’ policy, which explicitly categorized employees on the basis of
potential for pregnancy, constituted impermissible facial discrimination that could not be
defended as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).5
Johnson Controls is best known as a great victory for women’s rights and
reproductive freedom. It is the culmination of a long legal campaign to invalidate
restrictions on women’s employment based on pregnancy. It decisively narrows the use
of Title VII’s BFOQ exception to situations where “sex or pregnancy actually interferes
with the employee's ability to perform the job.”6 The case shows the potency of
litigation to mobilize alliances aimed at achieving legal change. Johnson Controls
brought together a remarkable coalition of labor, women’s rights, and workplace safety
activists. The case also illustrates the impact of relationships among repeat players in the
legal advocacy community, particularly the strong relationships between labor attorneys
in the UAW and feminist attorneys in national women’s rights organizations. The history
of this litigation alliance can be tracked through organizations’ participation as amici in
appellate and Supreme Court cases involving women’s rights. These cases powerfully
demonstrate the use of amicus briefs as opportunities to link the efforts of groups with
overlapping agendas and to shape the Supreme Court’s understanding of the surrounding
empirical, social and political context.
But Johnson Controls also provides important lessons about the narrowing effects
and fragility of litigation-centered mobilization. The issue framed in the courts
necessarily zeroed in on the unfairness of excluding only women from dangerous jobs
based on the potential impact on fetuses. But the problem, as it was experienced by
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women (and men) was far broader and more complex. As the stories of the Johnson
Control plaintiffs illustrate, gender bias permeated the way many industries and unions
responded to hazardous workplace conditions. It also shaped scientific research on
reproductive hazards. Moreover, removing fetal protection policies did not address the
underlying health and safety issues threatening the reproductive health of both men and
women. But like much test-case litigation, the Johnson Controls coalition was organized
to win the case at hand. Once the legal victory at the national level was achieved in the
courts, the national labor-women’s rights coalition assembled to achieve that goal proved
difficult to sustain, particularly in light of the increasingly conservative political and
regulatory environment. The anti-discrimination goals of the national advocacy groups
organized around test-case litigation had been met. The workplace health issues that
remained could not easily be addressed as discrimination issues in court. Administrative
agency support for addressing those issues did not exist at the national level. The
national groups disbanded and moved on to a new set of issues.
The Johnson Controls story poses questions that have taken on much greater
urgency in the current legal and political environment. What does this litigation-centered
focus for mobilization mean for how problems are defined and addressed? How does it
determine who participates in and influences the course of the advocacy and change
process? Does a national law reform campaign have the capacity to sustain public
attention to problems not addressed by the legal claim? Are there ways to connect
litigation to a broader mobilization strategy that keeps problems’ multiple dimensions in
view and sustains crucial alliances when litigation ends?
Interestingly, the federal mobilization story has a state-level analogue, which
adopts a different strategy for connecting litigation to mobilization. In the 1980s,
California employment, women’s rights, labor and public health advocates mobilized at
the state level to address the threat posed by workplace reproductive hazards and
industry’s response to them. Like their federal counterparts, this coalition used litigation
as a tool, challenging Johnson Controls’ fetal protection policy in California state court.
But the California initiative defined its agenda as developing long-term solutions to the
complex problems these hazards posed. They found venues beyond the courts to come
together and advocate for changes in employer practices affecting workers, including
educational arenas and media. They cultivated working relationships with non-lawyer
partners to keep the focus on issues broader than those defined by the legal standard. For
California advocates, the court victory did not fully solve the problem, and thus was only
a step toward the larger goal. Taking advantage of the more hospitable political and
regulatory environment and the diverse stakeholders at the table, the California coalition
undertook to mobilize in a way that would enable repeat players with long-term interests
to sustain their participation so that the problem, as experienced by workers, would be
addressed.
II.

Historical, Regulatory and Judicial Backdrop

A. The Origins of a Labor and Women’s Rights Alliance
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Workplace fetal protection policies that emerged in the 1970s were one chapter in
a long history of women’s exclusion from hazardous but higher paying jobs. They were
rooted in the stated goal of protecting the health and safety of women and their offspring.
A century of this state protectionist legislation and a longstanding tradition of maledominated unions had effectively precluded women in the past from accessing physically
demanding and high-paying factory jobs.7 Indeed, before the 1960s, women’s absence
from these jobs had become largely normalized in the national psyche.8 Many unions
had opposed women’s entry into traditionally male positions and supported protectionist
legislation and policies.
With the passage of new civil rights laws in the 1960s, however, industries and
unions faced legal challenges to the exclusion of women from these jobs. The civil rights
and women’s rights movements gave rise to landmark civil rights legislation, including
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the creation of
administrative agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The law
now required employers and unions to admit women to employment unless their
exclusion could be justified.
Many groups formed in the wake of this legislation, which had opened up new
avenues for mobilization, activism, and litigation. After the passage of Title VII,
employers and unions seeking to preserve the status quo focused on pregnancy and
argued for a broad BFOQ exception that would exclude women from jobs perceived as
posing risks to them or their unborn children. As major unions like the AFL-CIO and the
International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE)9 hesitated to
advocate on behalf of labor women in the 1960s, women formed their own groups to
challenge employers’ restrictive practices. Some unions, responding to the demands of a
growing female membership, changed their position and challenged policies
discriminating based on pregnancy. This mobilization included a developing alliance
between segments of the labor movement and women’s rights advocates.
In contrast to other unions, the UAW had historically been active in the women’s
and civil rights movements. The UAW was the first union to establish, in 1944, a
Women’s Department, and as early as the 1960s it was lobbying the EEOC to oppose
protectionist legislation.10 In 1966, Betty Friedan, former EEOC commissioners, a UAW
Women’s Committee representative, and members of state women’s status commissions
formed the National Organization for Women (NOW) in reaction to a lax EEOC response
to sex discrimination.11 In 1974, a UAW leader became the first president of the
Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), a group of women who felt powerless within
their unions and sought to develop a women’s agenda within the established labor
movement.12 Many UAW lawyers had a background in and commitment to women’s
rights and connections with women’s rights organizations across the country.
Women’s groups celebrated several judicial, legislative, and administrative
agency victories in the Title VII arena in the early 1970s. A new crop of women’s rights
groups soon emerged, looking to make these victories the beginning of something
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larger.13 All of these groups came to play an important role in developing litigation,
legislative, regulatory, and other advocacy strategies to promote women’s rights, and they
became important players in the events producing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson Controls.
B. Mobilization Around Supreme Court Losses
Several Supreme Court decisions in the 1970’s threatened women’s progress
toward workplace equality, and defined the mobilization agenda for women’s groups and
their sympathetic labor partners. These cases became the focus of a sustained law reform
campaign. Pregnancy discrimination– reflected in a constellation of employers’ policies
including forced leave, loss of seniority, lack of medical coverage, and outright dismissal
for pregnant workers—was one of the first issues that this new coalition of women’s
groups tackled.14 The first major case in this area was Geduldig v. Aiello,15 an
unsuccessful 1974 equal protection challenge to California’s refusal to grant disability
benefits to pregnant women. Foreshadowing what would soon become a familiar amicus
lineup, the ACLU, AFL-CIO, EEOC, IUE, Physician’s Forum, and WEAL filed an
amicus brief arguing that the policy was unconstitutional.
In the years following Geduldig, women’s groups looked to Title VII, rather than
the Constitution, as a means to combat pregnancy discrimination. In General Electric v.
Gilbert,16 the Supreme Court rejected IUE’s Title VII challenge to General Electric’s
disability plan which, like California’s, did not grant disability benefits to pregnant
women. The Court held that, under Title VII as well as the equal protection clause,
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination.
Women’s groups immediately mobilized in response to Gilbert and, alongside
labor and civil rights groups and churches, soon formed the 300-plus member Campaign
to End Discrimination against Pregnant Workers (CEDAPW) with the express goal of
legislatively overruling Gilbert. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.
In 1983, the Supreme Court again saw the familiar lineup of amici from Geduldig
and Gilbert in Newport News v. EEOC, where the Court found that a corporate policy
granting better pregnancy benefits to female employees than to the wives of male
employees violated Title VII.17 Four years later, in California Federal Savings & Loan v.
Guerra, the Court ruled that policies that treated pregnancy more favorably than other
disabilities were lawful under the PDA, since Congress intended the PDA to promote
equal employment opportunities for women and to be a floor, not a ceiling.18
Significantly, Guerra produced a rift amongst the nation’s women’s rights groups. East
Coast organizations, including the ACLU WRP, NOW LDEF, the Women’s Law Project,
NWLC, and WLDF, feared the implications of promoting measures that could be viewed
as “special protections” for women and thus submitted “equal treatment” amicus briefs in
support of neither party and that advocated treating pregnant women the same as other
disabled individuals. West Coast organizations, including the Legal Aid Society-
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Employment Law Center (LAS-ELC), ERA, the California Teachers’ Association, the
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Northwest
Women’s Law Center, and the San Francisco Women Lawyers Alliance, as well as Betty
Friedan and CLUW, submitted “special treatment” amicus briefs in support of the
respondent emphasizing the importance of recognizing the real differences between men
and women and the harms suffered by women whose employers ignored their pregnancyrelated needs. Several years later, as the Johnson Controls case worked its way up to the
Supreme Court, these groups reunited in a common effort to eradicate fetal protection
policies.
At the same time that PDA-related litigation was winding through the courts,
litigants were struggling to define the scope of Title VII’s BFOQ exception. In 1977, the
Supreme Court found in Dothard v. Rawlinson that a prison could properly assert a
BFOQ defense to justify the prison’s decision to hire only male guards in contact areas of
maximum security male penitentiaries.19 The Court found that “[t]he likelihood that
inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a real threat not
only to the victim of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and
protection of its inmates and the other security personnel.”20 Because maintaining safety
and order were related to the “essence” of the employer’s business, the Court found that it
could categorically exclude women from certain jobs.21 Several federal courts, relying on
Dothard, subsequently permitted airlines to use the BFOQ defense to justify layoffs of
pregnant flight attendants, on the ground that the airlines’ policies were necessary to
ensure the safety of passengers. 22
Dothard had opened the door to widening the BFOQ standard by permitting sex
stereotypes to be a legitimate basis for excluding women from jobs. Advocates wondered
whether Dothard could jeopardize their momentous gains on the pregnancy
discrimination front. In particular, they worried that the case could lead to legal
recognition of the fetus as a “third party” whose safety was placed at risk by its mother’s
employment. The concern was that courts would permit employers to exclude women
based upon concerns for fetal safety.
C. The Failure of Regulatory and Litigation Efforts Proceeding Under
Workplace Health and Safety Requirements
Statutes and regulations governing health and safety offered another avenue for
tackling the reproductive hazards facing women and men in the workplace. These
efforts, however, were thwarted by agency paralysis and litigation failures.
On December 29, 1970, after much political wrangling, President Nixon signed
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA Act),23 creating an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) that was charged with promulgating workplace
health and safety standards and conducting inspections to monitor compliance with these
standards. 24 Between 1971 and 1984, OSHA implemented fifteen standards regulating
toxic substances, including lead.25 Chronic overexposure to lead through inhalation or
ingestion, the agency found, could cause severe damage to the blood-forming, nervous,
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urinary, and reproductive systems of men and women.26 In order to avoid the risks posed
to workers by exposure to lead throughout a working lifetime, the agency stated, worker
blood lead levels should be maintained at or below 40 [mu]g/100g, and the blood lead
levels of all workers who intend to have children should be maintained below 30
[mu]g/100g “to minimize adverse reproductive health effects to the parents and to the
developing fetus.”27
In November 1978, OSHA passed a controversial new lead standard that required
employers to remove from the workplace any employees – female and male – with
abnormally high blood lead levels or actual physical impairment from lead exposure, to
place these employees in low-exposure workplaces or on leave, and to continue to grant
them the earnings, benefits, and seniority rights of their original jobs for at least 18
months.28 The impact of the new lead standard reverberated throughout the United
States, where industry consumed annually over one million tons of lead and at least
800,000 workers, representing 120 occupations in over 40 industries, were exposed to
airborne lead on the job.29
Although OSHA’s lead standard addressed both male and female-mediated harm
resulting from workers’ exposure to airborne lead, the majority of the studies upon which
it relied focused on female-mediated risk. Importantly, the biological mechanism by
which paternal transmission of a toxin to a fetus occurs is scientifically difficult to
identify. Therefore, scientists in the 1970s and 80s studying the effects of exposure to
toxic substances in the reproductive context had focused almost exclusively on
teratogenic effects –the effects of maternal transmission to a developing fetus – and had
largely overlooked the effects of paternal environmental exposure on offspring. 30
Moreover, science is not immune to the gender stereotypes and biases that pervade other
fields and industries. Many scientists researching reproductive hazards have mistakenly
assumed that only the fittest sperm can and will fertilize an egg, or that there is an
exclusive link between birth defects and maternal transmission of toxins.31 Recent data
indicate these assumptions are incorrect, and that both paternal and maternal exposure to
numerous chemical, physical, and biological agents can cause spontaneous abortions or
birth defects.32
OSHA’s increased attention to the health hazards associated with lead and the
growing scientific research linking maternal lead exposure with birth defects in children
alarmed many corporations in the chemical and heavy metal industries. Corporate
lawyers feared that the growing focus on lead would result in the filing of multi-million
dollar lawsuits on behalf of children with lead-related birth defects, since the workers’
compensation system, which bars employees from suing employers on their own behalf
for health problems associated with workplace hazards, does not foreclose litigation on
behalf of a fetus. Doctors employed by industry advocated protecting women from
potential toxic exposure as a matter of public health and to avoid medical malpractice
lawsuits.33 Corporate executives were concerned about the ethical dilemmas posed by
risking harm to a fetus by exposing pregnant (or “potentially” pregnant) workers to lead.
Managers and industry scientists were convinced that it was not technologically or
economically feasible to clean up workplaces enough so that all workers would have
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blood lead levels below OSHA’s standard.34 Male factory workers and supervisors
continued to resist women’s entry into traditionally male jobs. In response to these
considerations, many major automobile, chemical, tire, and photographic manufacturing
companies adopted fetal protection policies throughout the 1970s that, despite the dictates
of the new OSHA lead standard, transferred or banned women (without compensation)
from jobs in which they were exposed to airborne lead and other toxic substances.35
Fetal protection policies, initiated around the same time that protectionist
legislation was being dismantled nationwide, effectively re-segregated (by gender) many
of the forty-plus industrial workplaces nationwide in which employees were exposed to
lead. By the time the PDA was enacted in 1978, fetal protection policies marked a
growing trend amongst industry leaders, one that commentators thought signaled “the
emergence of a major new civil rights and civil liberties issue that poses medical, legal,
economic, and moral dilemmas.”36 The issue involved not only women’s rights in the
workplace, but also “the more portentous question” of the reproductive harms caused to
both men and women by exposure to toxic substances at work.37
Women’s rights and labor advocates initially enlisted OSHA’s support in both
invalidating fetal protection policies and reducing health risks to women and men. This
mobilization began with a challenge to American Cyanamid Company’s fetal protection
policy. In January 1978, just four years after women were first hired on the production
floor of the company’s lead pigment plant in Willow Island, West Virginia, American
Cyanamid instituted a policy barring women from all jobs on the factory floor except
those who underwent surgical sterilization.38 Five female employees, aged 26 to 43,
chose sterilization over job loss. When they returned to work, male co-workers taunted
them for having been “spayed” by the veterinarian.39
Workers filed complaints with their union, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union (OCAW), and the union went public with the story of the sterilization in
late 1978. “No More Willow Islands” became a “rallying cry” of unions and interest
groups.40 Soon, more than 44 feminist, labor, civil rights, and civil liberties
organizations41 joined together to form The Coalition for Reproductive Rights of
Workers (CRROW), whose statement of purpose read:
To resist sex-biased sex-specific policies from the outset; to push corporations to
eliminate hazards affecting all workers, regardless of sex or occupation; and to
devise compensatory strategies, such as voluntary “reproductive leave” or
transfers, with full pay and benefits for both female and male workers in jobs
where hazards still exist.42
CRROW initially framed the problem broadly. Reflecting the breadth of its
membership’s interests, the coalition sought to link the pursuit of substantive workplace
safety precautions with eliminating sex discrimination.
OCAW and CRROW teamed up to respond to American Cyanamid, and the first
step in their advocacy strategy was to lobby OSHA – at the time a friendly ally, having
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recently lowered its blood lead level standards and denounced fetal protection policies as
an unacceptable response to concerns about workplace health – for action.43 In May
1979, OSHA levied fines against Cyanamid for overexposing workers to lead and cancercausing chromates,44 and in October 1979, the agency charged Cyanamid with violating
the “general duty clause”45 of the OSH Act, which obligates employers to provide safe
workplaces to employees, by subjecting female employees to the “hazards” of
sterilization as a condition of employment.46 After extensive administrative litigation, in
which OCAW and CRROW were intimately involved, the independent Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) vacated the citation on April 29,
1981,47 finding that that the decision to be sterilized was due to external economic factors
for which the company was not responsible and concluding that “the [fetal protection]
policy is not a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause.”48 OCAW appealed
to the D.C. Circuit.
Before the case was heard on appeal, Joan Bertin from the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project filed and settled a companion case that challenged American Cyanamid’s
fetal protection policy under Title VII. Bertin had also assisted OCAW in developing the
factual record and expert testimony in the OSHA case. On appeal, the three-judge panel,
which included then-Judges Bork and Scalia, unanimously affirmed the OSHRC’s
decision.49 Judge Bork wrote for the majority, finding that American Cyanamid’s women
workers had no remedy under the Occupational Safety and Health Act for being “put to
the most unhappy choice” between sterilization and discharge in a case such as this,
where the employer complied with OSHA’s lead-level standard and still did not eliminate
the risk of serious harm to fetuses carried by women employees.50
In the wake of American Cyanamid, CRROW and its members pressured the
EEOC and other executive agencies to propose guidelines on workplace reproductive
hazards and fetal protection policies.51 In 1980, the EEOC proposed guidelines that
permitted single-sex exclusionary policies temporarily and as a last resort, and forbade
use of the BFOQ defense in the context of fetal protection policies. OSHA assisted with
the development of the guidelines and initially agreed to provide technical assistance with
enforcement.52 These guidelines prompted grievances from groups on both sides of the
aisle, and the Carter-appointed EEOC, fearing that the incoming Reagan administration
would significantly alter the guidelines, withdrew them and instead issued a simple
statement that discrimination claims related to fetal protection policies should be resolved
on a case-by-case basis.53 The EEOC subsequently drafted a supplement to its 1981
Compliance Manual directing field offices to coordinate with OSHA and other agencies
to evaluate scientific data relevant to a claim. However, this section was also withdrawn
after budget cuts at OSHA precluded it from participating in this collaboration.54
From 1981 to 1988, the EEOC had no guidelines for evaluating claims related to
fetal protection policies, and claims that were filed during this period were often left
unresolved.55 In 1988, the EEOC issued a Policy Statement which provided that the
business necessity test, rather than the more rigorous BFOQ test, should be the
appropriate measure of the legality of a fetal protection policy under Title VII.
Contemplating a far less prominent role for OSHA, the 1988 Guidelines directed the
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EEOC to OSHA’s expertise “whenever possible,” but declined to characterize OSHA’s
determinations about workplace hazards as binding on the EEOC.56
The 1988 guidelines also declared that, in cases where there was inconclusive
evidence about the effects of workplace hazards on male workers – even if this paucity
was due to the fact that this evidence did not exist (rather than some inconsistency in
existing evidence) – the EEOC could consider the claim as if the hazard was
“substantially confined to female employees.”57 Because the limited scientific data that
existed focused far more on the effects of maternal transmission of toxins to a fetus than
on the effects on a fetus of paternal exposure to such toxins, these guidelines operated as
a disincentive to employer-sponsored research on paternally-transmitted risks and
ultimately encouraged employers to exclude women from the workplace.58
The EEOC was not alone in responding passively in the 1980s to the growing
corporate fetal protection policy trend. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP), which is specifically authorized under Executive Order 11246 to
require non-discrimination for private employers who contract with the federal
government, did little in the 1980s and instead deferred to the EEOC as the appropriate
agency to take action in the area.59 Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency
repeatedly delegated responsibility for investigating chemicals used in the workplace to
OSHA. 60 The EEOC’s unwillingness to incorporate health and safety concerns into its
anti-discimination approach seemed to deflate the robust coalition of these interests.
Subsequently, CRROW does not appear much in the Johnson Controls story. Advocates
increasingly focus their challenges to fetal protection policies on anti-discrimination
arguments.
Throughout the 1980s, OSHA, the EEOC, EPA, and OFCCP “engaged in a
balancing approach forced by political exigency,”61 industry pressure, inadequate
funding, and the looming abortion issue. The Reagan administration cut agencies’
budgets and operating staffs and their ability to formulate policy and enforce existing
regulations, and Congress was not interested in taking on the fight against this
deregulation. The retreat of both Congress and executive regulatory agencies from the
fetal protection debate created a policy vacuum in which agencies maintained out of date
standards and only minimally enforced their own regulations, and in which employers
knew they could get away with using toxic chemicals and adopt fetal protection policies,
even if doing so might technically violate agency guidelines.
In this context, advocates turned once again to the courts as a potential avenue for
dismantling fetal protection policies. This time, however, they avoided litigating under
OSHA and turned instead to the Title VII sex discrimination framework. This move
began the process of narrowing from a multi-prong, problem-oriented coalition to an
alliance focused on winning a test case.
D. The Development of a Litigation Strategy Under Title VII

10

Between 1982 and 1990, five federal appeals courts heard Title VII challenges to
sex-specific fetal protection policies.62 Ordinarily, a policy that specifically excludes
women from the workforce will be considered intentional discrimination under the Title
VII “disparate treatment” framework. An employer can justify such an employment
practice only in “those certain instances where [sex] is a bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.”63 Courts considering fetal protection policies, however,
repeatedly reasoned that these cases presented new and unique issues that justified
straying from traditional proof rules. Instead, most courts applied a “disparate impact”
analysis, under which neutral policies or practices that have a disproportionate and
adverse impact on any protected class constitute discrimination. An employer can justify
an employment practice that has a disparate impact with a lesser showing that it is “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”64
Some courts indicated that the “valid business necessity” defense could cover
employers’ legitimate business interests in avoiding tort lawsuits filed by the children of
lead-exposed mothers.65 Others emphasized that fetal protection policies were most
justifiable if intended to protect the safety of third parties – in this case, the “unborn
children” of female employees.66 Over time, corporate defendants increasingly focused
on this moral/public policy justification for adopting fetal protection policies and
deemphasized the financial considerations related to tort liability. These decisions
energized the women’s rights and labor advocates that had already been working together
on fetal protection issues and marked a new phase in the movement.
Various members of the now-familiar cast of characters – labor, civil, and
women’s rights groups on one side, and corporations, pro-business groups, and antiabortion advocates on the other – participated in PDA-related advocacy in the 1970s and
fetal protection-related litigation in the 1980s as attorneys for the parties and as amici.67
Marsha Berzon, the Associate General Counsel of the AFL-CIO, who argued the Johnson
Controls case before the Supreme Court, was a principal drafter of the PDA, which, she
said, had been deliberately drafted with sex-specific fetal protection policies in mind.68
Another major figure representing the anti-fetal protection policy position was Joan
Bertin of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, who had spent much of the decade
working on American Cyanamid and other projects to lay the groundwork for a Supreme
Court case challenging fetal protection policies. Bertin has been described as the
“mastermind” behind the campaign against fetal protection policies69 The alliances she
created with other advocates set the wheels in motion for a challenge to the company’s
policy, and the UAW was positioned to take a leading role in representing Johnson
Controls employees across the country who sought to challenge a policy they viewed as
discriminatory, unfair, and archane. This law reform campaign was characterized by
participants as the equivalent of the NAACP strategy in Brown v. Board of Education.
The long range strategic plan was to have this issue determined favorably in the Supreme
Court.70
III.

Johnson Controls: The National Story
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Johnson Controls initially adopted a policy in 1977 that warned fertile women of
the potentially harmful effects of lead on a fetus but stopped short of excluding them
from the workplace.71 Five years later, in 1982, the company decided to rethink its
approach. Corporate executives at Johnson Controls publicly explained that the policy
shift was implemented in response to increasing scientific research pointing to risks of
fetal harm associated with lead and upon realizing that its current program was not
effectively protecting workers’ fetuses. However, rumors were circulating that the
company, like others in the industry, initiated the new policy in response to rising fears of
tort liability. Lead was an essential component of batteries, so the company could not
simply stop using lead in battery production. Johnson Controls had spent $15 million
since 1978 on new equipment to remove lead from factory air, but the company believed
that reducing airborne lead to a safe level for fetuses would be extremely costly, if not
technologically impossible.72
As a result, Johnson Controls implemented its exclusionary fetal protection policy
relatively late in the game in comparison to other giants in the chemical and heavy metal
industries. This triggered the litigation that became the capstone of the effort to overturn
fetal protection policies and narrow the scope of the BFOQ.
A. Johnson Controls litigation in the lower courts
The UAW’s assistant general counsel filed EEOC charges on behalf of 8
individual plaintiffs under Title VII, which issued right-to-sue letters in early 1984.
Plaintiffs then filed suit in federal court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In early
1985, the district court granted class certification to the UAW and its 2,109 production
and maintenance employees (of whom only 275 were female).73 From the beginning, the
case was worker-driven. Beverly Tucker, a UAW attorney, described the workers as
“adamant” about pursuing the case even when the attorneys who represented them
expressed initial reservations after learning of new research that showed harmful effects
of even lower lead exposure levels than previously thought.74 The UAW filed the
complaint in Johnson Controls with the plan that it would be a “test case, a policy case”
that could eventually get to the Supreme Court.75 In January 1988, the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, relying on a disparate impact framework, granted summary judgment for
Johnson Controls.76 Later that year, the EEOC published its first “Policy Guidance on
Reproductive and Fetal Hazards,” which adopted the disparate impact approach and
pronounced that an exclusionary fetal protection policy could constitute a business
necessity if an employer could prove that a workplace toxin posed a substantial risk to the
fetus, that this risk only occurred through maternal exposure, and that no less restrictive
alternatives existed.
By the time the case was appealed in February 1988, it had attracted considerable
outside attention. The LAS-ELC, the ACLU, and the American Public Health
Association (APHA) each filed separate amicus briefs in support of the UAW, and Joan
Bertin from the ACLU began assembling amici for a potential appeal to the Supreme
Court.
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In September 1989, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision in Johnson Controls in a sharply divided 7-4 en banc decision.77 The
Seventh Circuit found that the company’s fetal protection policy was valid under
disparate impact and disparate treatment frameworks, becoming the first court of appeals
in the country to hold that women’s infertility could be a BFOQ for certain jobs.78 The
court found that Johnson Controls had demonstrated a valid business necessity – “the
industrial safety-based concern of protecting the unborn child from lead exposure” – for
its fetal protection policy.79 Moreover, the court disregarded the OSHA lead standard
and discounted animal studies on the effects of paternal exposure to lead as
inconclusive.80 Employing the reasoning of the recent Supreme Court case Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio,81 the Seventh Circuit placed the burden of proving
discrimination, and disproving the company’s claimed business necessity, on the
plaintiffs.
Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook dissented. Judge Posner took an
intermediate approach to the case, noting that the “the most sensible way to approach it at
this early stage is on a case-by-case basis,” and upon a full examination of the facts at
trial.82 Judge Posner left room for the possibility that under certain circumstances, fetal
protection policies could be “reasonably necessary to the normal (civilized, humane,
prudent, ethical) operation of [a] particular business” and could constitute grounds for a
BFOQ of infertility.83
Judge Easterbrook went several steps further, concluding that the fetal protection
policies at issue were facially discriminatory and that, under the PDA, Johnson Controls
only had available to it a narrow BFOQ defense – not the business necessity defense that
previous appellate courts had applied in similar cases. He concluded that the company’s
stated objectives – concern for the welfare of the next generation – did not meet that test
because they were not related to its ability to make batteries or to any woman’s “ability or
inability to work.”84 Picking up on a creative argument advanced by the plaintiffs, he
noted that “[r]emoving women from well-paying jobs (and the attendant health
insurance), or denying women access to these jobs, may reduce the risk from lead while
also reducing levels of medical care and the quality of nutrition.”85 Judge Easterbrook,
perhaps sending a signal to the Supreme Court, noted that Johnson Controls was “likely
the most important sex-discrimination case in any court since 1964, when Congress
enacted Title VII. If the majority is right, then by one estimate 20 million industrial jobs
could be closed to women, for many substances in addition to lead pose fetal risks.”86
The sharply divided Seventh Circuit decision in Johnson Controls caught the
attention of the EEOC, which, in January 1990, issued revised policy guidance on
workplace reproductive hazards that criticized the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and
asserted that fetal protection policies were facially discriminatory; that the employer
should be held to a narrow BFOQ defense, rather than that of business necessity; and that
the burden of proof should be on the employer, not the employee. The guidance
indicated that, outside the Seventh Circuit, the EEOC would require employers to show
that such policies were reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business,
based on objective evidence, and that a good-faith intention or effort to avoid liability
would be an insufficient defense. The new EEOC guidelines were issued just two days
13

before the UAW’s deadline for filing its certiorari petition to the Supreme Court. These
guidelines served as a de facto substitute for an amicus brief (since governmental
agencies generally do not submit amicus briefs on certiorari petitions).87
B. Litigation before the Supreme Court
The UAW filed a petition for certiorari. The ACLU, APHA, and 54 other groups
and individuals filed an amicus brief supporting that petition, arguing that the case
presented issues of great public importance in the equal opportunity and public health
arenas, particularly to working women and their families, and that a Supreme Court
decision resolving the conflicting circuit opinions was needed. In March 1990, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.88 In the months before oral argument, the
California Court of Appeal and the Sixth Circuit came down with the first two rulings
rejecting a BFOQ defense and finding that fetal protection policies that excluded leadexposed female employees constituted unlawful sex discrimination under a disparate
treatment theory.89
The plaintiffs reassembled their legal team to handle the Supreme Court briefing
and argument, bringing on two experienced Supreme Court litigators from the AFL-CIO,
including Associate General Counsel Marsha Berzon. The UAW followed a fairly
traditional approach in its briefing on the merits, focusing on questions concerning the
interpretation of Title VII, the PDA, and the BFOQ exception, and leaving its amici to
highlight the economic and social impact of exclusionary sex-specific fetal protection
policies on working women. The union pointed to the PDA and OSHA standards and the
California Johnson Controls case in support of its argument, emphasizing that under Title
VII, the Court must look only to whether or not women could perform the job – not at
Johnson Controls’ purpose, however benign, in adopting an exclusionary policy.
Johnson Controls responded by arguing that a company’s interest in avoiding
harm to third parties, including fetuses, was reasonably necessary to the company’s
normal business operations under Title VII and thus justified its implementation of an
exclusionary fetal protection policy. The BFOQ analysis, Johnson Controls argued, was
not only limited to a worker’s ability to perform the job; a valid BFOQ defense could also
include potential tort liability against the company for a fetal injuries.
The UAW responded by noting, as it had in earlier disputes, that Johnson
Controls had not presented any evidence that men were not at risk for contributing to
fetal injuries; that the company could not, under the BFOQ defense, institute a policy of
zero risk for fetuses and not for adult workers; that female workers must make their own
personal risk assessments; and that responsible employers would not be liable in tort for
prenatal harm.
C. Amicus mobilization
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Bertin, who had consulted with the
UAW in the early stages of the case, assumed the pivotal role of amicus brief
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coordinator.90 Working closely with Berzon and others, she spearheaded a
comprehensive amicus strategy that mobilized a broad-based coalition of influential
amici to rally behind the sex discrimination principles at stake in the case and to frame
those principles in the context of their broader institutional agendas. This amicus
mobilization had several functions. First, securing such diverse and overwhelming
opposition to fetal protection policies from experts and other credible sources, Bertin and
Berzon felt, would convey a powerful message to the Supreme Court about the
importance of the issue and the strength of the empirical and normative consensus behind
the union’s position. The amicus briefs also provided a comprehensive picture of the
harmful effects of fetal protection policies on women and offered arguments to the Court
that were more far-reaching and nuanced than those presented by the UAW.
Furthermore, the very process of developing a group of amici could reaffirm existing ties
between organizations that had previously participated in CRROW, CEDAPW, and other
related initiatives, and could spur and sustain, during and after the Supreme Court
litigation, new relationships between advocates interested in reproductive and workplace
hazards and sex equality. Ultimately, over 110 organizations and individuals signed onto
ten amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs.
1. Communicating Credibility and Consensus
One goal of the amicus mobilization was to show the Court that a broad array of
prominent interest groups and experts viewed exclusionary fetal protection policies as
unlawful sex discrimination and embraced the narrow BFOQ standard articulated by the
UAW plaintiffs. With this goal in mind, Bertin and Berzon successfully courted many
groups with longstanding experience litigating before the Supreme Court and a
background in women’s and/or workers’ rights advocacy.
The ACLU, the most active amicus party in the case, had actively participated in
Supreme Court challenges to sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and
reproductive hazards since the early 1970s, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg founded the
Women’s Rights Project. Its Johnson Controls amicus brief argued that Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, represents a comprehensive legislative attempt to eradicate gender
discrimination and recognize the serious socio-economic and health consequences of
unemployment and occupational segregation on women and families, and that fetal
protection policies, offering “neither workplace safety for men nor equity for women,”
violate these clear objectives. Thirteen scientists and experts, and forty-one organizations
(including unions, labor organizations, and civil, women’s, and workplace rights
advocates, some of whom – such as LAS-ELC, the National Women’s Law Center, and
NOW LDEF – were repeat players in the pregnancy discrimination arena) signed onto the
brief, which Bertin authored.91
Well-known women’s rights organizations also signed onto another amicus brief
authored by Equal Rights Advocates (ERA), which argued that the PDA intended to
classify pregnancy-based exclusions as facial discrimination, that only an employee’s
ability to perform the job – and not fetal health – was relevant in considering the BFOQ
exception, and that fetal protection policies could only be legally adopted if they were sex
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neutral. With such strong legislative history, Berzon thought this brief would be “our real
ace in the deck.”92
Another notable set of amici were state governments. The State of California
submitted an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to model its decision on the
California Johnson Controls case, which California’s Fair Employment and Housing
Commission had recently litigated with LAS-ELC. The Massachusetts Attorney General,
joined by several other states, filed an amicus brief addressing the public health, gender,
and socio-economic dimensions of the case and underscoring the dangers posed to male
reproductive systems by airborne lead. The United States and the EEOC jointly filed an
amicus brief focusing on the Title VII framework of the case. Interestingly, the
U.S./EEOC’s amicus brief argued that under certain circumstances – including when the
health or safety of a fetus is at risk – an employer could justify its sex-based fetal
protection policies under the BFOQ test. This was a much more cautious approach than
the policy guidance on the fetal protection issue that the EEOC had issued just two days
before the UAW filed its certiorari petition, and was likely due to the Solicitor General’s
involvement in the litigation.
A final set of amici were public health and environmental groups such as the
APHA and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). These groups’ briefs
emphasized the validity and importance of animal studies, a topic the Court had only
previously considered in passing.
The prominence of many amici and their nuanced understandings of the vast
implications of the Johnson Controls case lent a sense of legitimacy to the amicus
mobilization. Although the Court never specifically acknowledged any particular amicus
brief, it is worth noting that the opinion emphasized the legislative history of the PDA,
the topic of the ERA’s amicus brief.
2. Providing a Context for Understanding Fetal Protection Policies’
Harmful Effects on Women
In Johnson Controls, the UAW could not, for the most part, draw the Court’s
attention to the important health and safety issues underlying the case because these
issues were tangential to the sex discrimination questions before the Supreme Court.
Bertin, understanding and appreciating the seriousness of these issues, capitalized upon
the recognized expertise and legitimacy of well-known public interest organizations to
address the intersections between gender, economic and social power, and workplace
health and safety via amicus briefs. She realized, for instance, that scientific evidence or
public health data would be presented more effectively by groups such as the NRDC and
the APHA than by the ACLU and women’s rights organizations. The amicus briefs in
support of the plaintiffs fell into roughly two different (though sometimes overlapping)
categories: women’s rights/anti-discrimination and public health.
Some of the more far-reaching arguments set forth in the amicus briefs addressed
the socio-economic and public health implications of fetal protection policies. The
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ACLU, ERA, and Attorneys’ General briefs noted that fetal protection policies would
cause women’s unemployment or employment in lower-strata, non-unionized jobs that do
not offer medical insurance and other important benefits. The NAACP LDF brief
observed that this result “may be more harmful than the potential hazard to
uncontemplated future offspring posed by working in a job which may involve exposure
to hazardous substances”93 Notably, the NAACP LDF, known for its legal challenges to
racially discriminatory policies, entered the reproductive health arena for the first time
with Johnson Controls. Marianne Lado, the LDF attorney who authored its amicus brief
in Johnson Controls, described the case as a “bridge case into the reproductive rights
area,” which ultimately resulted in LDF coming to see reproductive health issues as
“squarely within its area of expertise.”94
3. Building Organizational Alliances
Through the amicus briefs, Bertin, Berzon, and their colleagues reinvigorated and
gave voice to the alliance that had formed between labor, workplace health and safety
groups, and women’s and civil rights organizations over the past two decades through the
formation of groups such as CRROW and CEDAPW, via concerted advocacy efforts
surrounding the passage of the PDA and related policies before OSHA and the EEOC,
and by way of amicus briefs in fetal protection and pregnancy discrimination cases.
These groups collectively produced a broad policy statement through their amicus briefs
and advocacy in Johnson Controls that addressed health and safety, sex discrimination,
job and benefits retention, socio-economic mobility, and other complex dimensions of the
problems posed by fetal protection policies and workplace toxins.
The question remained, though, whether their involvement as amici would make a
difference to any mobilization or advocacy that occurred afterwards. WRP had been
preparing for a fetal protection/sex discrimination test case for a decade, and if the
plaintiffs’ challenge in Johnson Controls succeeded, it was unclear who, if anyone,
would push ahead on the remaining health and safety issues after the litigation was over.
IV.

The Supreme Court Decision & Its Aftermath

On March 20, 1991, the Supreme Court issued a 9-0 decision overruling the
Seventh Circuit’s decision and finding that Johnson Control’s fetal protection policy was
facially discriminatory because it categorized employees on the basis of their potential for
pregnancy, which was prohibited by Title VII, as amended by the PDA. The BFOQ
defense was not available to Johnson Controls, Justice Harry F. Blackmun wrote for the
majority, because fetuses were neither customers nor third parties (following Dothard
and Harriss) whose safety was essential to the normal operation of the business.95
Furthermore, the Court found, a benevolent motive, such as concern for fetal harm, could
not justify female sterility as a BFOQ. Justice Blackmun opined that employer liability
“seem[ed] remote at best” if the employer adequately warns the employee about the risk
and has not acted negligently.96 In any event, the Court thought, tort liability could not
justify a discriminatory policy under Title VII.

17

In concurrence, Justice White, Kennedy, and Rehnquist asserted that Justice
Blackmun’s “speculation” about tort liability would be “small comfort to employers,”
and that an employer who was able to set forth evidence that fertile women’s presence in
a workplace made the company susceptible to serious tort liability could have a valid
BFOQ defense if it chose to exclude fertile women from its workforce.97 Justice Scalia
concurred separately, asserting that a court may take costs to a company into account
when ruling on a BFOQ defense.
The Supreme Court’s decision made nationwide headlines. Women’s rights
groups and organized labor celebrated the decision as a victory for millions of working
class women. The business community decried the decision as creating a “catch-22”
situation for industry, and expressed grave concerns about future corporate tort liability.
The EEOC, following its pattern of issuing guidelines in response to judicial
decisions, issued new policy guidance in June 1991 that replaced its old policy guidance
and adopted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson Controls. The new policy stated that
employer policies excluding only members of one sex from the workplace for the
purpose of fetal protection were unlawful under Title VII and could not be justified under
the BFOQ exception.98
Congress, too, was supportive of the Court’s decision. A 1990 Congressional
study issued a “scathing indictment” of the EEOC’s response to fetal protection policies
in the preceding decade.99 One year later, Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act100
to, among other things, mitigate the chilling effects of repeated federal court decisions
(especially Wards Cove) that restricted plaintiffs’ ability to bring Title VII disparate
impact suits.

~
Judges, scholars, and journalists alike have ranked Johnson Controls among the
most significant Title VII and PDA cases. The Court’s decision reaffirmed the broad
scope of the PDA and the narrow scope of the BFOQ defense under Title VII.
Employers quickly complied, at least de jure, with the Court’s decision, and advocates
witnessed a relatively smooth and speedy end to the sex-specific, exclusionary corporate
fetal protection policies that they had vigorously opposed for over a decade.101
Johnson Controls’ concrete holding and immediate impact have, in fact, made it
more a darling of law review articles than the courts. A Westlaw search reveals that only
207 courts, compared with 900 law review articles, have cited to Johnson Controls.
Despite this outpouring of scholarship, the academic literature has paid little attention to
the unique nationwide coalition of labor, workplace health and safety advocates, and
women’s rights lawyers that formed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to collectively
oppose fetal protection policies. How this group came together, and ultimately dissolved,
is its own unique story that speaks volumes about legal mobilization and the
sustainability of reform efforts.
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Mobilizing these diverse interest groups to attack fetal protection policies – a
relatively narrow problem that affected a relatively small number of people – took a
tremendous amount of energy. Joan Bertin from the ACLU had been largely responsible
for this nationwide mobilization. Once the Supreme Court decision came down in
Johnson Controls, however, these groups “declared victory and retreated to their
traditional issue areas.”102 Bertin, exhausted from nearly a decade-long battle, left the
ACLU and entered academia. Women’s rights organizations and advocates turned to
focus on the developing cause of action for sexual harassment, which would enter into
Supreme Court litigation in the 1990s.103 Unions and health and safety groups were left
to advocate for the workplace rights of the blue-collar work force, even though the past
decade had, in a sense, shown them that no branch of government was willing to tackle
workplace health and safety issues in a holistic way. Moreover, Johnson Controls
illustrated that improving the terms and conditions of work for the labor force required
presenting the public and the courts with a problem that had shock value – like an
exclusionary fetal protection policy that resulted in sterilization – and that was couched
within a viable framework – like sex discrimination.104 General concern over unsafe
working conditions, particularly when couched within an OSHA framework, would just
not cut it.
Unions had limited success in winning legislative, judicial, and regulatory
protections for workers in the 1990s. The ultimate survival of the OSHA lead standard
against court challenges provided for economic protection and independent medical
review for male and female workers involuntarily removed from or hoping to be removed
from lead exposure and lead hazards were much abated by other provisions of this
standard.105 While advocates were ultimately successful in convincing OSHA to
promulgate rules on bloodborne pathogens, cadmium, lead and asbestos in construction
and confined spaces, a host of other regulatory proposals continually languished before
the agency. 106 Unique coalitions that formed during and after the Johnson Controls era
faced repeated setbacks, especially after the second Bush administration took office in
2001. The problem of protecting reproductive health for women (and men) who might
have sought relief from known reproductive health hazards—such as infectious disease in
childcare and healthcare settings, anaesthetic gases and radiation in healthcare settings,
and solvent exposure in dry cleaning—was never addressed.107 After the Bush
administration overturned a proposed ergonomics standard, more than 50 labor,
occupational safety and health, public health, civil rights, religious, women’s, and other
organizations collectively petitioned the Secretary of Labor in April 2001 to issue an
alternative standard, but the Labor Department never responded.108 Similarly, after a 15year dialogue between industry groups, unions, and state and federal agencies on
improving injury and illness recordkeeping and data, a revised regulation was issued in
January 2001. In June 2003, the Bush administration deleted key elements of the
regulation, despite opposition from the unions.
V.

A Contrasting Model: The California Example

While the specific goal of advocates at the national level was to establish, through
litigation, the illegality of exclusionary fetal protection policies under Title VII and to
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affirm the narrowness of the BFOQ defense, a coalition of California advocates emerged
in the 1980s with a problem-centered orientation and a broader set of goals to develop a
long term strategy for addressing the reproductive health risks and needs of women and
men working in hazardous industries. They adopted a holistic approach that included but
also extended beyond the discrimination framework. Even before the Johnson Controls
decisions (the California Court of Appeals’ and the Supreme Court’s), Patricia Shiu from
the LAS-ELC convened an ad hoc committee, designated The Workplace Reproductive
Hazards Policy Group, to develop a strategy for tackling the intersecting issues of
economic and social power, gender, and workplace health and safety that had clearly
emerged in the fetal protection debate. At the table were diverse stakeholders – including
experts in reproductive technology, occupational medicine and health, employment
discrimination law, and workers’ compensation and tort liability law – representing the
LAS-ELC, the Santa Clara Center for Occupational Safety and Health (SCOSH), the
California Department of Health Services’ Occupational Health Program, the School of
Public Health at the University of California, Berkeley, and the California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission (which, along with Shiu, brought the state court
lawsuit against Johnson Controls).
The California committee members shared the sentiments of national advocates
who had litigated the Supreme Court Johnson Controls case that exclusionary fetal
protection policies constituted unlawful sex discrimination, and they celebrated the
Johnson Controls decisions as an “important first step towards eradicating occupational
reproductive hazards.”109 Like their national counterparts, they also realized that
“[e]xisting federal and state antidiscrimination law provides a very incomplete set of
protections for workers exposed to reproductive hazards,”110 and that as a result, the
national mobilization over sex-specific fetal protection policies, and the Johnson
Controls decisions themselves, did not (and probably could not) address the larger
challenges faced by many low-income, non-unionized women and men of childbearing
age who worked in contaminated workplaces.
The California initiative had several distinct advantages that allowed it to address
intersectionality issues of health and safety and women’s rights. First, California offered
a political climate that provided some, albeit limited, possibilities for regulatory and
legislative reform in the workplace health and safety arena. Also, the California
committee members were affiliated with organizations whose wide-ranging,
intersectional mandates embraced broad long-term goals and advocacy strategies that
ultimately allowed for organizational cross-pollination that was sustainable beyond a
particular issue or campaign. Finally, the California group was guided by Shiu, who was
well-connected with diverse stakeholders and was deeply committed to a strategy that
took account of the mutual and sometimes divergent interests at the table. For Shiu, it
was essential that advocates embracing a sex discrimination analysis also be “sensitive to
the economic differences between poor and working class women and women [who]
might have a greater ability to resist and challenge fetal protection policies because of
their wage-earning capacity.”111 Shiu also saw the connection between health and safety
issues and women’s rights as “primarily one of economic justice and education,”112 since
many working poor women, a large proportion of whom were racial and language
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minorities, “were ill-informed about the effect of the toxins with which they worked, the
legal implications for agreeing to work with those toxins, and the potential, probable and
likely health outcomes for themselves and their families.”113
After both Johnson Controls decisions, and at the request of California
Assemblymember Jackie Speier, the California group analyzed federal and California law
and policy in the reproductive health arena from several perspectives: occupational health
regulation, equal opportunity and sex discrimination, disability law and the principle of
“reasonable accommodation,” and tort liability and workers’ compensation.114 After a
“series of lively discussions,”115 the group published a white paper in early 1992
recommending legislative and political responses to the continuing challenges faced by
Californians who are exposed to reproductive hazards at work. The white paper focused
on key questions concerning these challenges: What reproductive health issues do women
working in contaminated worksites continue to confront? What types of scientific data
are necessary to fill in research gaps concerning reproductive technology? What are
potential remedies (e.g., statutory, tort, workers compensation) for workers exposed to
reproductive hazards on the job?116 After Johnson Controls, would employers feel
entitled to invoke the Supreme Court decision as their rationale for exposing pregnant
women to workplace contaminants as a condition of employment?
The California coalition proposed a set of policy recommendations to address the
issues raised in its white paper.117 Around the same time, the group also drafted and
successfully advocated for the passage of an amendment to California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act that required employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
pregnant women who work in hazardous workplaces. Such accommodations would, for
example, permit pregnant employees to take temporary paid leaves of absence from toxic
workplaces or temporarily transfer to less toxic worksites while maintaining their
economic benefits, seniority status, and advancement opportunities.
The California experience is instructive as an alternative to the model of
mobilization and advocacy embraced by the national coalition in the lead-up to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson Controls. The California group embraced a
problem-oriented approach to address reproductive hazards in the workplace, using
litigation and the sex discrimination framework as only one component of a long-term
strategy that involved public education and outreach, legislative advocacy, and regulatory
reform. With this structure and vision, the California coalition was able to link the
Johnson Controls litigation to the health and safety issues that national advocates had
also identified. In contrast to the national mobilization, which centered around litigation
and largely disbanded after the Supreme Court victory, the California advocates hit the
ground running after the Johnson Controls decisions, prepared to tackle, through a
multifaceted advocacy strategy, the next piece of the reproductive hazards puzzle.
VI.

Conclusion: Significance and Legacy of Johnson Controls

Johnson Controls is a story of the strengths and limitations of mobilizing a broad
set of interest groups and institutional agendas in the context of impact litigation, and the
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possibilities for reform that emerge from such mobilizations. On the one hand, the
mobilization of diverse groups around a narrow issue can have a powerful impact, as
evidenced in Johnson Controls. Several groups representing a wide range of interests
supported a common position in the case. The diversity of these groups’ interests,
coupled with the uniformity of their message, effectively demonstrated a widespread
problem to the Supreme Court and undoubtedly had some impact on the Court’s ruling
reaffirming key anti-discrimination principles.
On the other hand, narrowly-focused impact litigation often produces limited
results that do not address a problem holistically. As some commentators have
suggested, Johnson Controls affirmed an important anti-discrimination principle but
ironically left women with the right to work in unsafe workplaces. It did not, for
example, address the flip side of the fetal protection question: what protections did the
law offer women factory workers who wanted to take time off or be transferred in order
to protect fetal health? The national groups that mobilized to support the UAW were
neither equipped nor (in some cases) interested in addressing this and other questions that
naturally followed from the Johnson Controls decision. The example of California,
discussed above, contrasts with the federal picture, and is instructive for thinking through
these limitations and about potential solutions.
Johnson Controls is also a story about how political realities shape advocacy
efforts. Many members of the group that represented plaintiffs and amici before the
Supreme Court had experienced firsthand the ineffectiveness of OSHA and the EEOC in
addressing workplace lead exposure and reproductive hazards issues, and remembered
clearly when the D.C. Court of Appeals issued a crushing blow to the plaintiffs in
American Cyanamid. These unsuccessful efforts left advocates with few options to
address their concerns about fetal protection policies. In the political climate of the
1980s, the sex discrimination framework appeared much more viable than did agency
lobbying or an OSHA cause of action.
In the context of repeated political and litigation setbacks, a diverse set of
stakeholders, each with different institutional priorities, came together to communicate a
unified message: exclusionary fetal protection policies violated Title VII and the PDA,
and could never fall within the BFOQ exception. After their victory before the Supreme
Court, these stakeholders understood that a larger battle lay ahead to compel employers to
clean up unsafe workplaces and grant the requests of fertile employees who sought leave
from these unsafe workplaces in order to reduce the risk of reproductive harm caused by
workplace toxins. Yet although these groups understood this larger battle, most of them
did not participate in it – at least not as a member of this same coalition. Rather, for the
most part, groups retreated to their traditional issue areas, recognizing that political
realities precluded another large-scale mobilization to address these larger issues.
Broadly-defined mobilizations focused on the narrow goal of winning a case in
court may be successful in the short term and may establish important legal principles,
but may not be sustainable as a way to address long-term and complex realities,
particularly in the lives of marginalized and disempowered populations. The upshot of
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such narrowly focused mobilizations may be that, as in Johnson Controls, concerted
mobilization wins an important battle for a client or institution or both, but is not
sustainable beyond a specific moment in time.
As federal courts become less available as a site for affirmative progress, social
justice advocates must address problems involving race and gender in the context of
broader structural dynamics in order to make a difference on the ground. Public interest
organizations must rethink their litigation-centered strategies to find new sites of
mobilization and ways of sustaining coalitions that cut across different interests and
locations. The Johnson Controls story provides some insight into the challenges and
opportunities for making this transition.
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